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1 Introduction
Dynamic economies, although perfectly competitive, may yield ineﬃcient outcomes. The
purpose of this paper is to revisit the roles played by intergenerational altruism and life
expectancy in such failure of the first welfare theorem. It is well-known that macrody-
namic models with finite-lived and selfish individuals are compatible with (dynamically)
ineﬃcient equilibria, while models with infinite-lived and dynastically altruistic individ-
uals are not. This suggests that strong intergenerational altruism within the population
and long life expectancy prevent the occurrence of ineﬃcient equilibria. This conclusion
runs against the microeconomic intuition. Loving one’s heirs or expecting to live for a
long time are typical saving motives. In turn, this should favor overaccumulation. This
paper presents a continuous time OLG model which generalizes the Blanchard-Buiter-
Weil model and allows to clarify the relationships between dynastic altruism, the length
of planning horizons, and dynamic (in)eﬃciency. Our main innovation relies on the in-
troduction of parental altruism, whose intensity is variable. We reach three main results.
First, we show that parental altruism and life expectancy actually favor overaccumula-
tion. Second, we explain why dynamic ineﬃciency cannot result in the Ramsey model:
a necessary condition for overaccumulation implies the nonexistence of a dynamic com-
petitive equilibrium. Third, theoretical results are illustrated by a parameterization from
US data. Our numerical exercises suggest that the US economy is dynamically eﬃcient,
mainly because life expectancy is suﬃciently short.
In a path-breaking paper, Diamond (1965) shows that an overlapping-generation
(OLG) economy with productive capital can reach a dynamically ineﬃcient steady state.
Dynamic ineﬃciency means oversavings/overaccumulation1: gross investment exceeds
gross capital income and it is possible to increase the consumption of at least one gen-
eration without reducing the consumption of any other. Overaccumulation consists of a
major market failure, since it gives some relevance to the use of public debt, or the creation
of pay-as-you-go retirement schemes. Economists have for long questioned the causes of
overaccumulation. In particular, they have pointed out the role played by intergener-
ational links and the length of planning horizons. Given that Ramsey-type economies
never oversave, one may wonder which structural parameter is responsible for dynamic
ineﬃciency. A wide consensus in the literature emerged after the cutting-edge paper of
1The first studies of ineﬃcient capital accumulation are due to Phelps (1961, 1965) and Koopmans
(1965). Major developments were subsequently proposed by Cass (1972) and, concerning OLG economies,
by Shell (1971), Balasko and Shell (1980), Okono and Zilcha (1980) and Saint-Paul (1992). Galor and
Ryder (1991) provide suﬃcient conditions on technological parameters that rule out dynamically ineﬃ-
cient steady states in the Diamond model. Note that a complete resolution of the problem when agents
live for two periods can be found in De la Croix and Michel (2002).
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Weil (1989). Weil shows that some ‘disconnectedness’ between families is required to
obtain dynamically ineﬃcient steady states2. By disconnectedness, he means that all
agents do not belong to the same representative family. In our paper, we aim to answer
the three following questions. How do parental altruism and life expectancy relate to
dynamic eﬃciency? If altruism and the length of horizons favor dynamic ineﬃciency, why
are Ramsey-type economies — where agents are infinite-lived and love all their children —
dynamically eﬃcient? Are real economies dynamically ineﬃcient?
We propose a generalization of the continuous time OLG models of Blanchard (1985),
Buiter (1988) and Weil (1989). This generalization introduces a variable degree of family
altruism. There are productive capital, capital depreciation, labor-augmenting technical
progress, and CRRA preferences. The model’s key innovation resides in its demographic
side. We make four major assumptions. First, each individual is perpetually young (Blan-
chard, 1985): he/she may die with age-independent risk δ at each instant. Second, there
is intra-family growth: children are born at rate m. Third, there is inter-family growth:
there is a continuous inflow of new families, and such inflow grows at rate n. This is due
to immigration. Finally, there is selective altruism (Abel, 1988) within families: only a
proportion λ of children benefits from the love of their parents, while the remaining 1−λ
are unloved, disinherited children. We shall refer to λ as the intensity of parental altru-
ism, or parental altruism for short. These diﬀerent assumptions have several immediate
implications. On the one hand, the rate of disconnectedness is nE = (1− λ)m+ n. It is
decreasing in the intensity λ of parental altruism. On the other hand, the previous models
studied in the literature are special cases of ours. In particular, the Ramsey (1928) model
with population growth corresponds to 1−λ = δ = n = 0: there are no unloved children,
no risk of dying, and no entries from outside the economy.
We prove the uniqueness of a saddle-path stable steady state before studying its dy-
namic eﬃciency. There is dynamic eﬃciency whenever the stationary diﬀerential between
the interest rate and the output growth rate — we call it the interest-growth spread — is
nonnegative. We then turn to the three questions marked above.
To answer the first question, we analyse the eﬀects of parental altruism λ and risk of
dying δ on the occurrence of dynamically ineﬃcient steady-states. Each of these parame-
ters is likely to alter the interest-growth spread through its impact upon the family-saving
behavior, or its eﬀect upon the composition by age of the population. Our results do not
suﬀer from any ambiguity. Parental altruism reduces the interest-growth spread. In-
deed, parental altruism does not alter output growth, while it does increase each family’s
propensity to save. Similarly, the risk of dying increases the interest-growth spread — why
2Weil (1989) does so in an exchange economy, but generalizes his result to capital accumulation in the
appendix.
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should one save for a very unlikely future? Our main conclusion follows: altruism and life
expectancy favor dynamic ineﬃciency.
To answer the second question, we show that dynamic ineﬃciency cannot result in
the Ramsey model because it would imply the nonexistence of a competitive equilibrium.
The explanation relies on Shell (1971). Shell noticed that the present value at competitive
price of society’s wealth is infinite in dynamically ineﬃcient situations. But, in Ramsey-
type economies, the family wealth is equivalent to the economywide wealth. This explains
why overaccumulation cannot happen in such economies: overaccumulation, defined as a
negative interest growth spread, implies that the present value of family wealth is infinite.
This is not compatible with the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Hence, a typical
necessary condition for the existence of a stationary state forbids dynamic ineﬃciency.
Unlike Ramsey-type economies, OLG economies are compatible with dynamic ineﬃciency.
Indeed, the present value of family wealth is finite if the interest rate is greater than the
family wealth growth rate. Given that unloved children and migrants enter the economy
at constant rate, the family wealth growth rate is lower than the economy growth rate,
which gives rise to overaccumulation.
To answer the third question, we consider a parameterization of our model on US
data. This may seem strange: given the simplicity of the condition of dynamic eﬃciency,
that is a negative interest-growth spread, why not directly test dynamic eﬃciency on
adequate time series data? In fact, this strategy of research has been pursued on several
occasions (see Abel et al, 1989), and does not seem too costly. Indeed, choosing the
true rate of return on savings seems a priori easier than determining the fair value of
parameters related to individual preferences. Yet there are two strong reasons to proceed
as we do. On the one hand, direct tests of overaccumulation mainly reveal themselves to
be inconclusive. The results dramatically depend on the proxy of the real rate of return
on savings. If one chooses the short-term real interest rate on government debt, a risk-free
asset, then overaccumulation results. Such rates have been below one percent over the
previous half century in most OECD countries, while the output growth rate averaged
three percent. If one chooses some market based value of the rate of return on capital,
then dynamic eﬃciency obtains. Such rates of return are usually much higher than output
growth rates. On the other hand, Tirole (1985) has shown that dynamically ineﬃcient
steady states are likely to produce bubbles on artificial or real assets. In such cases, excess
savings may be captured by the bubble, up to the Golden Rule level. Hence, following
Tirole’s argument, we could never observe a negative interest-growth spread, even though
the steady state would be dynamically ineﬃcient.3
3Tirole provides conditions under which there is a multiplicity of equilibria which may even be Pareto
ranked. In the absence of a selection mechanism one cannot claim that the ineﬃcient steady state will
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Our numerical experiments question the plausibility of the set of pairs (intensity of
parental altruism, risk of dying) leading to dynamically ineﬃcient equilibria. We use US
demographic data from the 1990s to set the birth rate and the immigration rate. The
technological parameters — elasticity of output with respect to capital, capital depreciation
rate, and stationary productivity growth rate — are set to standard values. The preference
parameters are much less consensual. We start by setting the pure rate of time preference
at one percent per year, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at one. Dynamic
ineﬃciency always occurs when the agents are infinite-lived, but it is ruled out for plausible
values of life expectancy. A sensitivity analysis reveals that less conservative choices for
the preference parameters can yield more ambiguous results. However, they are typically
associated with very low values of the pure rate of time preference4, or very large values
of elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We thus claim that suﬃciently short lifetimes
(δ >> 0) and imperfect parental altruism (λ << 1) prevent the occurrence of dynamically
ineﬃcient equilibria in the US.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves its steady
state. Our main theoretical results are exhibited in section 3, while section 4 considers a
broad calibration of the US economy. All proofs are set forth in the Appendix.
2 The model
We describe a continuous time OLG model à la Blanchard-Buiter-Weil with productive
capital, CRRA preferences, exogenous productivity growth and both intra- and inter-
family demographic growth. The main innovations relate to the demographic and family
assumptions.
2.1 Assumptions
Demographics. Time is continuous and goes from 0 onward. The population consists
of individuals who belong to diﬀerent families. Each individual faces the constant risk
of dying δ ≥ 0. He/she may also give birth to a child at the constant rate m ≥ 0.
However, some of these children are born unloved — they are ‘disinherited children’ in the
terminology of Abel (1988). As a family is defined with respect to the notion of dynastic
altruism — see Barro (1974) — unloved children do not belong to existing families, and thus
never be observed.
4There are strong reasons to calibrate the pure rate of time preference this low. As reported by
Bullard and Russell (1999) (who actually defend negative rates of time preference), it is probably the
only way to reconcile the fairly low observed real interest rates on risk-free assets, and the strong growth
of individual/aggregate consumption.
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generate new families. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of loved children. The parameter
λ is the intensity of parental altruism, or parental altruism for short. In addition, there
is a constant inflow of external families entering the economy at rate n ≥ 0. Typically, n
is the rate of immigration.
Define:
nI = λm− δ (1)
nE = n+ (1− λ)m (2)
where nI is the internal rate of growth of existing families, while the stock of families
grows at external rate nE. We shall refer to nE as the degree of disconnectedness, or
disconnectedness for short. Disconnectedness unambiguously decreases with parental al-
truism.
The demographic structure of our model encompasses several earlier models. In the
Ramsey case — the optimal growth framework — there is no disconnectedness in the econ-
omy, which corresponds to n = δ = 0 and λ = 1. The Blanchard (1985) case of selfish
agents with “finite horizons” and constant population corresponds to λ = m = 0 and
n = δ > 0. The length of the residual life-span follows a Poisson process, of which δ is the
instantaneous death rate. Hence, each individual/family has an age-independent residual
life expectancy worth 1/δ. The Weil (1989) case of overlapping families with infinitely-
lived agents is obtained when λ = δ = 0. Finally, the Buiter (1988) model corresponds to
δ > 0, λ = 0 and n ≥ 0.
Family behavior. Let N (τ , t) denotes the size at time t of the family who entered the
economy at time τ ∈ [0, t]. We have:
N (τ , t) = N (τ , τ) exp [nI (t− τ)] (3)
Let c (τ , t) denote the consumption at time t of an individual who belongs to the family
who entered the economy at time τ . The objective of the representative individual of such
a family is:
V (τ , t) =
Z +∞
t
exp [− (ρ− nI) (z − t)]u (c (τ , z)) dz (4)
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference. Instantaneous utility u only depends on
consumption. To make aggregation easier, we limit our study to the class of CRRA
functions. Hence,
u (c) =
c1−1/σ − 1
1− 1/σ (5)
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). At this stage, we must
provide a restriction ensuring that the integral in equation (4) converges. For this purpose,
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let A (t) ≡ egt be the level of technological progress embodied in labor with g ≥ 0. To
ensure that (4) is always finite the pure rate of time preference ρ must satisfy:
ρ > ρlim ≡ nI + g (1− 1/σ) (6)
There is a single asset which yields a risk-free interest rate r (t). Each individual supplies a
unit of labor and receives an age independent wage w (t). Let x (τ , t) denote the financial
wealth at time t of an individual who belongs to the family having arrived at time τ . The
per capita budget constraint is:
∂x (τ , z)
∂z
= [r (z)− nI ]x (τ , z) + w (z)− c (τ, z) (7)
Per capita financial wealth increases at rate r minus the growth rate of the family, plus
the spread of wage income over per capita consumption. As we highlight below, our
formalization encompasses several earlier contributions. However, models with selfish
individuals of uncertain lifetimes require a slightly diﬀerent interpretation of the budget
constraint (7). In such models where nI = −δ, individuals have no concern for their
heirs. As they may die with the positive (flow) probability δ, they face the perspective of
leaving unintended bequests to their children. There is thus a demand for insurance which
takes the following form (see Yaari, 1965 and Blanchard, 1985): insurance companies
make premium payments to the living in exchange for the receipt of their estates in the
event they die. Assuming perfect competition on the insurance market and abstracting
from transaction costs in the insurance industry, the risk premium paid by the insurance
company is δ.
Families enter the economy with no financial assets, but the families present at time
t = 0 endowed with positive nonhuman wealth. Hence,
x (τ , τ) =
(
0 if τ > 0
x0 > 0 if τ = 0
(8)
A No-Ponzi game condition is assumed such that:
lim
z→∞
x (τ , z)β (t, z) ≥ 0 (9)
where β (t, z) ≡ exp
¡
−
R z
t [r (s)− nI ] ds
¢
is the discount factor prevailing between dates
t and z.
Aggregation. Let N (t) denote the size of the population at time t. We have N (τ , τ) =
nEN (τ). To obtain the population size at time t, we sum the diﬀerent families available
at each time. Using (3),
N (t) = N (0) exp [nIt] +
Z t
0
N (τ , t) dτ = N (0) exp [(nI + nE) t] (10)
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where nI+nE ≡ n+m−δ is the total population growth rate. Without loss of generality,
N (0) ≡ 1 is assumed.
Due to population and productivity growth, the model is nonstationary. We there-
fore consider the following standard transformation. For any private variable y (τ , t), its
aggregate ‘productivity detrended’ per capita counterpart is denoted by:
y (t) = A (t)−1
½
y (0, t) exp [−nEt] +
Z t
0
nE exp [−nE (t− τ)] y (τ , t) dτ
¾
(11)
In equation (11), nE exp [−nE (t− τ)] is the weight in the population as of time t of
the families who entered the economy at time τ . Per capita (detrended) variables are
therefore altered by changes in the rate of entry of new families through a composition
eﬀect. Note that the intra-family growth rate nI does not create such a composition eﬀect.
Demographic parameters thus aﬀect aggregate variables through two distinct channels:
intra-family growth modifies the microeconomic behavior of each family, while inter-family
growth aﬀects the composition by age of families.
Technology. Output is produced by a neoclassical technology with capital depreciation.
Let k be the capital stock per eﬃcient unit of labor, µ ≥ 0 be the depreciation rate, and
A (t) f (k) be the production function in intensive form. The function f : [0,∞)→ [0,∞)
is such that f 0 (k) > 0 and f 00 (k) < 0 for all k > 0, and f (0) ≥ 0, lim
k→∞
f (k) = ∞.
Two points should be noticed concerning the generality of our assumptions upon the
technology. First, we allow for capital depreciation. Second, the function f is compatible
with a large set of production functions, including CES technologies. These restrictions
do not guarantee the existence of equilibrium. We shall provide additional constraints on
the function f later.
2.2 Dynamics and the stationary equilibrium
Let k and c denote respectively the aggregate capital and consumption per eﬃcient unit
of labor and p the propensity to consume out financial and human wealth.
Lemma 1 The intertemporal equilibrium is the solution of the following system:
k˙ = f (k)− (µ+ nI + nE + g) k − c (12)
c˙ = {σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ]− g} c− nEpk (13)
p˙ =
∙
1− (1− σ) [f
0 (k)− µ]− nI + σρ
p
¸
p2 (14)
with k0 ≡ x0 given,
lim
z→∞
β (t, z)ω (z) = 0 (15)
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and
lim
z→∞
[(1− σ) (f 0 (k (z))− µ)− nI + σρ] > 0 (16)
The presence of the rate of disconnectedness nE in the consumption equation (13) is
the main departure from the optimal growth model induced by this type of OLG structure.
Note that conditions (15) and (16) guarantee that human wealth and the propensity to
consume out of total family wealth are both positive and finite.
A non-trivial stationary equilibrium is a strictly positive vector (k∗, c∗, p∗) that solves
k˙ = c = p˙ = 0 and satisfies:
lim
z→∞
[f (k∗)− k∗f 0 (k∗)] exp [− (f 0 (k∗)− µ− nI) z] = 0 (17)
(1− σ) (f 0 (k∗)− µ)− nI + σρ > 0 (18)
The following result summarizes our knowledge of the stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Existence and properties of stationary equilibrium.
(i) There exists a unique stationary equilibrium if
f 0 (0)− µ > max
½
nI − σρ
1− σ , ρ+
nE + g
σ
¾
. (19)
(ii) If there exists an equilibrium, it satisfies
ρ+ g/σ ≤ f 0 (k∗)− µ ≤ ρ+ (nE + g) /σ. (20)
(iii) The equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
Point (i) provides a suﬃcient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a sta-
tionary equilibrium with positive capital and consumption while Point (iii) recalls that
the stationary equilibrium has the saddle-path property, which implies that the perfect
foresight trajectory is uniquely determined.
Point (ii) provides bounds for the stationary interest rate r∗. To understand these
bounds, assume that the economy is in steady state and let c (a) and x (a) denote ‘pro-
ductivity detrended’ consumption and assets of an individual who belongs to the repre-
sentative aged-a family. Using (30) and (31), one has:
c (a) = c (0) exp [σ (r∗ − ρ) a] (21)
x (a) =
w (a)
r∗ − nI − g
{exp [(σ (r∗ − ρ)− g) a]− 1} (22)
Consider first the lower bound ρ + g/σ. Indeed, r∗ > ρ + g/σ means that individual
consumption grows at a higher rate than wages. As ρ > ρlim, equation (22) implies
10
that financial wealth is positive at all ages and increases with age. Since individuals are
endowed with zero wealth at birth, they never accumulate if r∗ = ρ+ g/σ and are always
indebted if r∗ < ρ+ g/σ. In both cases, the ‘initial’ families are the only savers, and their
savings are allocated between productive capital and loans to other families. This is not
compatible with a constant stationary k∗, unless external growth nE = 0. In this latter
case, r∗ = ρ+ g/σ.
We now turn to the upper bound ρ + (nE + g) /σ. Observe that ‘productivity de-
trended’ stationary average consumption is worth:
c = lim
a→∞
c (a) exp [− (nE + g) a] +
Z ∞
0
nE exp [− (nE + g)α] c (α) dα (23)
The term nE exp (−nEα) is the weight of aged-α families in the population. Consequently,
the term nE exp [− (nE + g)α] c (α) is the weight of aged-α family consumption in average
consumption. It declines with age at rate nE + g. Suppose that r∗ > ρ + (nE + g) /σ.
The consumption growth rate of each member of a given family would be higher than
the rate at which the relative weight of the family declines. Aggregate consumption per
capita would therefore not be finite — which is impossible by construction. The particular
case r∗ = ρ+(nE + g) /σ leads to the same result, except in the case where nE = 0. This
explains why r∗ is lower than ρ+(nE + g) /σ. In the Ramsey case, external growth is nil,
i.e. nE = 0. Consequently, the lower bound equals the upper bound and the stationary
interest rate is r∗ = ρ+ g/σ.
3 Dynamic eﬃciency, parental altruism and life ex-
pectancy
This section contains our main theoretical results. We proceed in four steps. First, we
define dynamically (in)eﬃcient stationary equilibria. Second, we focus on the role played
by parental altruism λ. We show that increasing λ raises the likelihood of dynamic
ineﬃciency. Third, we concentrate on the risk of dying δ. We show that decreasing δ
raises the likelihood of dynamic ineﬃciency. Finally, we oﬀer additional results concerning
the remaining parameters of the model.
3.1 Dynamic (in)eﬃciency with productive capital
Let us first recall the condition for dynamic (in)eﬃciency: a competitive allocation is not
a Pareto allocation whenever it is possible to increase the consumption of at least one
generation without decreasing that of any other. In an economy with capital accumulation
and an exogenous productivity trend, this leads to the following definition: a competitive
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path is dynamically ineﬃcient if and only if detrended per capita capital is higher than
that which maximizes detrended per capita consumption, the so-called Golden Rule of
capital accumulation (Phelps, 1961).
Using equation (12), stationary per capita consumption is maximized for k = bk if and
only if µ + nE + nI + g > 0 and f 0
³bk´ = µ + nE + nI + g, or µ + nE + nI + g ≤ 0 andbk = +∞. This leads to the following property.
Property 1 Let γ ≡ r∗ − (n+m− δ + g) be the interest-growth spread. The stationary
equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient if and only if (i) µ + n + m − δ + g > 0 and
γ ≥ 0, or (ii) µ+ n+m− δ + g ≤ 0.
The interest-growth spread γ is the actual discount rate used to compute the present
value of the economy’s wealth — the ‘wage bill’ in the words of de la Croix and Michel
(2002). Dynamic eﬃciency means that the present value of the economy’s wealth is finite:
there is nothing to redistribute at the end. Conversely, overaccumulation means that the
present value of the economy’s wealth tends towards infinity.
Let us write down the interest-growth spread γ in a convenient way. Let
α (k) ≡ f
0 (k)− (µ+ nE + g)
f (k) /k − (µ+ nE + g)
(24)
Since f 0 (k∗) ≥ ρ + µ + g/σ and ρ > ρlim, we have f 0 (k∗) > µ + nE + g. Moreover, the
strict concavity of function f guarantees that f (k) /k > f 0 (k) for all k > 0. Consequently,
0 < α (k∗) < 1 for all k > 0.
Simple manipulations at steady state using (12), (13) and (14) yield:
γ = ρ− ρlim +
nE
σ
[α (k∗)− σ] (25)
We can deduce three properties from this equation.
First, ρ ≥ ρlim means that dynamic ineﬃciency cannot occur in Ramsey models, in
which nE = 0. Indeed, Point (ii) of Proposition 1 provides a lower bound for the interest
rate: r∗ ≥ ρ+ g/σ. Together with ρ > ρlim, this condition implies that r∗ > nI + g. The
intuition for this result is very simple. Dynamic ineﬃciency means that the resources of
the whole economy are infinite. But, in Ramsey models, family wealth coincides with the
economy’s wealth. Thus, family wealth in a dynamically ineﬃcient economy is infinite.
This implies the nonexistence of a competitive intertemporal equilibrium, a contradiction.
Second, dynamic ineﬃciency requires some disconnectedness, that is nE must be pos-
itive. This result is well-known since Weil (1989), who shows in a model with m = δ = 0
that n > 0 is a necessary condition for dynamic ineﬃciency. It is important to understand
the exact role played by disconnectedness. Increasing the degree of disconnectedness does
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not necessarily raise the likelihood of reaching an ineﬃcient steady state (see sub-section
3.4). Disconnectedness creates a wedge between the growth rate of family wealth and the
growth rate of the economy’s wealth. Consequently, family wealth can be finite although
there is overaccumulation.
Third, the occurrence of dynamic ineﬃciency depends on the value of the EIS σ.
Overaccumulation may occur if the EIS σ is larger than α (k) for all k ≥ 0, which is
obviously the case5 when σ > 1. Conversely, overaccumulation can always be ruled out
when σ is low.
3.2 The role of parental altruism
In this sub-section, we consider the relationship between dynamic eﬃciency and parental
altruism λ. We study the marginal impact of λ upon the interest-growth spread γ.
Proposition 2 Dynastic altruism favors dynamic inefficiency.
Assume that there exists a stationary equilibrium.
(i) The interest growth spread γ is strictly decreasing in λ. Consequently,
(ii) If there is dynamic ineﬃciency in the Buiter model, i.e. λ = 0, then there is
dynamic ineﬃciency for all λ.
(iii) If there is dynamic eﬃciency when λ = 0, and dynamic ineﬃciency when
λ = 1, then there exists a critical intensity of parental altruism below (above) which
there is dynamic (in)eﬃciency.
The likelihood of dynamically ineﬃcient steady states rises with parental altruism.
Indeed, take the derivative of the interest-growth spread γ defined in Property 1 with
respect to λ:
dγ
dλ
=
dr∗
dλ
< 0 (26)
Parental altruism modifies the savings behavior of the family, while keeping intact the
growth rate of the economy. An increase in λ raises the family growth rate. Consequently,
it also increases the propensity to save of currently living individuals, who wish to maintain
the consumption level of each future member of the family. This reduces the interest rate.
Hence, a dynamically ineﬃcient equilibrium is more likely to occur when the family growth
rate is high.
Points (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2 draw simple corollaries of Point (i). They suggest
a methodology to analyze whether there is dynamic eﬃciency in a parametrized model or
5The condition σ > 1 is not a necessary condition for dynamic ineﬃciency, as our calibrations of
Section 4 leading to dynamic ineﬃciency show.
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not. One should first consider the case where there is no parental altruism, i.e. λ = 0. If
overaccumulation results, then there is overaccumulation for all intensities of parental al-
truism. If the equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient, then one should consider the polar case
where λ = 1 — or the highest λ compatible with the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
If dynamic eﬃciency prevails once again, then the equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient for
all λ. If there is overaccumulation, then there exists a unique intensity of parental altruism
that separates dynamic eﬃciency and dynamic ineﬃciency. Our numerical experiments
in the next section obey such a methodology.
3.3 The role of life expectancy
In this sub-section, we consider the relationship between dynamic eﬃciency and the risk
of dying δ.
Proposition 3 Long horizons favor dynamic inefficiency.
Assume that there exists a stationary equilibrium.
(i) The interest growth spread γ is strictly increasing in δ. Consequently,
(ii) If there is dynamic eﬃciency in the Weil model, i.e. when δ = λ = 0, then
there is dynamic eﬃciency in the Buiter model where λ = 0 and δ > 0.
(iii) If there is dynamic ineﬃciency in the Buiter model, i.e. λ = 0 and δ > 0, then
there is dynamic ineﬃciency in the Weil model, i.e. λ = δ = 0.
(iv) If there is dynamic ineﬃciency when δ = 0, there exists a critical risk of dying
above (below) which there is dynamic (in)eﬃciency.
Overaccumulation is more likely to occur more likely when life expectancy is long.
To understand this result, take the derivative of the interest-growth spread γ defined in
Property 1 with respect to δ:
dγ
dδ
=
dr∗
dδ
− d (n+m− δ + g)
dδ
(27)
Life expectancy has two eﬀects.
— On the one hand, it decreases the stationary interest rate. Other things being equal,
an increase in life expectancy raises the growth rate of the labor force. This leads to
a dilution eﬀect, whereby per capita capital is lower. The dilution eﬀect acts so as to
raise the marginal return on capital. However, the dilution eﬀect is oﬀset within each
family by a rise in the propensity to save, the concentration eﬀect. In the Ramsey case
where there is a unique family, the two eﬀects are exactly balanced and the stationary
per capita capital and interest rate do not depend on life expectancy. In the general case
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where disconnected families coexist, the concentration eﬀect is stronger than the dilution
eﬀect and the interest rate decreases.
— On the other hand, the fall in the risk of dying raises population growth. This
increases aggregate wealth. Both eﬀects strengthen each other and reduce the interest-
growth spread.
Proposition 3 sheds new light on Weil (1989). In the peculiar case where δ = λ = 0,
Weil (1989) shows that the equilibrium can be ineﬃcient. He concludes that the length
of planning horizons is not significant regarding the issue of overaccumulation. In fact,
Points (ii) and (iii) make clear that Weil’s configuration maximizes the likelihood of
dynamically ineﬃcient steady states. Moreover, Point (iv) tells that the equilibrium is
always dynamically eﬃcient when the risk of dying is high.
3.4 Other parameters
In this sub-section, we oﬀer additional results concerning the remaining parameters of the
model economy. We focus on the immigration rate n, the EIS σ, and the growth rate g
of labor productivity.
Proposition 4 EIS, productivity growth and immigration.
(i) The interest-growth spread is strictly decreasing in σ.
(ii) There exists g¯ such that there is dynamic (in)eﬃciency if g > g¯ and σ > 1
(≤ 1).
(iii) There exists n¯ > 0 such that there is dynamic (in)eﬃciency if n > n¯ and
lim
k→0
α (k) ≥ σ (< σ).
The likelihood of dynamically ineﬃcient steady states increases with the EIS σ. The
reason is straightforward. Indeed, σ has no direct impact on output growth, while it raises
the propensity to save out of total wealth. Capital, therefore, is more abundant. The
interest rate is lower, and so is the interest-growth spread.
Unlike the EIS, it is diﬃcult to establish an unambiguous relationship between the
growth rate g of labor productivity and the interest-growth spread. On the one hand, g
increases output growth, which tends to reduce the interest-growth spread. On the other
hand, g increases future wage earnings, which reduces the propensity to save. This makes
capital scarcer, and, therefore, the interest rate is higher. In Ramsey-type models, the
global eﬀect on the interest-growth spread simply depends on the EIS: the global eﬀect is
negative (positive) provided that σ > 1 (σ < 1). Point (ii) shows that this latter property
holds in our model for suﬃciently large growth rates.
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Increasing disconnectedness through immigration can work against dynamic ineﬃ-
ciency. To understand this point, note that both the interest rate and the growth rate
of the population are increasing in n. Unlike intra-family growth, immigration does not
directly influence saving behavior — see equation (22). However, it involves a composition
eﬀect that increases the weight of the population with low financial assets. Therefore,
it reduces aggregate per capita capital, which in turn raises the stationary interest rate.
The relationship between dynamic eﬃciency and the rate of immigration entry n is thus
ambiguous. Point (iii) shows that asymptotically, the eﬀect of n upon the occurrence of
dynamic eﬃciency crucially depends on parameter α (0).
Condition (iii) is very convenient in the CES case. Let f (k) =
£
πkφ + 1− π
¤1/φ
, for
all k ≥ 0, with π ∈ (0, 1) and φ < 1. Let a (k) ≡ kf 0 (k) /f (k) denotes the capital share
in gross output. Hence, condition (iii) becomes:
lim
k→0
∙
a (k)− (µ+m) k/f (k)
1− (µ+m) k/f (k) − σ
¸
≥ 0 (28)
which reduces to limk→0 [a (k)− σ] ≥ 0 since limk→0 k/f (k) = 0. Now, observe that:
lim
k→0
a (k) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if φ > 0
π if φ = 0
1 if φ < 0
(29)
At large n, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor has a crucial importance
regarding dynamic eﬃciency. Substitutability between capital and labor tends to generate
dynamically ineﬃcient steady states. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the question simply
depends on the π/σ ratio.
4 Is the US economy dynamically ineﬃcient?
Our theoretical analysis shows that parental altruism and life expectancy increase the
likelihood of dynamic ineﬃciency. The purpose of this section is to question whether
such theoretical points have any relevance from an empirical perspective. Our answer is
positive: other things being equal, our model suggests that the US economy would be
ineﬃcient if agents were infinite-lived. However, plausible values of the risk of dying and
the intensity of parental altruism are associated with dynamic eﬃciency.
4.1 Parameter values
We use US demographic data for the 1990s to discuss the relevance of dynamic eﬃciency
in the US economy. The US economy is especially interesting as immigration strongly
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contributes to demographic growth. The requirement of ‘some degree of disconnectedness’
is therefore satisfied, whatever the strength of altruistic links within families.
Average annual data presented in Table 1 show that two thirds of the population
growth is explained by natural growth, while the remaining one third is due to immi-
gration. Of course, these data are not representative of a stable population: cohorts of
the ‘baby boom’ were below ages of high mortality rate during the 1990s. Therefore, the
crude death rate underestimates its long-run value.
Table 1: US demographics
Crude birth rate m 1.55%
Crude death rate δ .87%
Natural increase growth m− δ .68%
Immigration rate n .35%
Population growth m+ n− δ 1.03%
For the production side of the model, we refer to the literature — e.g. see Prescott (1986).
The capital share in output is worth a = .36. Concerning capital depreciation, we take µ =
10%, which corresponds to an average capital life-span of ten years. Finally, the output
growth rate is set at g = 2%. Preference parameters are much less consensual and crucial
for our results. Clearly, the stationary equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient if the pure rate
of time preference is larger than the growth rate of output. Hence, many values that are
regarded as empirically plausible rule out steady states with over-accumulation. However,
many studies have reported even negative estimates of the rate of time preference6. The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) also plays an important role — as condition
(6) and Proposition 4 show. In our baseline simulation, we choose the EIS to be σ =
1 and the pure rate of time preference to be ρ = 1%. This is rather diﬀerent from
Bullard and Russel (1999) who set ρ = −1% and σ = .59. Consequently, we provide a
sensitivity analysis with σ ∈ [0.5, 2] and ρ ∈ [−1%, 3%] that therefore includes Bullard’s
and Russel’s choice of parameters. Table 2 recalls the values of the parameters in the
6See Bullard and Russel (1999) and the references therein — especially in sub-section 3.3.4. As Bullard
and Russel point out, such estimates are not surprising given the very low real interest rates and very
strong growth rates of individual/aggregate consumption.
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baseline simulation7.
Table 2: Parameters
Capital share, a .36
Capital depreciation, µ 10%
Output growth, g 2%
EIS, σ 1
Time preference, ρ 1%
We now discuss the occurrence of dynamic (in)eﬃciency relative to parental altruism and
life expectancy.
4.2 Results
The results of the baseline simulation are presented in Figure 1, which shows the pairs
(λ, δ) leading to dynamic eﬃciency and dynamic ineﬃciency. There are two lines, and a
set of plausible values. We now explain these various elements.
There exists a competitive equilibrium if and only if the pairs (λ, δ) are located above
the line of finite achievements. Such a line is obtained from equations (1) and (6) by
computing the risk of dying δ below which the objective of a dynasty diverges at stationary
prices. It is positively sloped, because an increase in parental altruism raises the internal
growth rate of the dynasty, that can only be balanced by a corresponding increase in the
risk of dying.
The equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient above the golden rule line. To obtain this
line, one must set the interest-growth spread to zero. Along the line, the risk of dying is
an increasing function of parental altruism. Indeed, parental altruism boosts the saving
motive, thereby decreasing the stationary interest rate. This must be compensated by an
increase in the risk of dying, which reduces savings and lowers the growth rate.
Finally, the set of plausible values corresponds to the pairs (λ, δ) that seem empirically
relevant. The risk of dying δ must belong to [0.014, 0.025]. The lower bound corresponds
to an expected lifetime of 70 years, while the upper bound corresponds to an expected
(active) lifetime of 40 years. Given that the golden rule line depends much more on δ
than on λ, we have decided to let λ free8.
Figure 1 displays two main results. First, dynamic ineﬃciency is compatible with
the US fundamentals. It is a typical result of our simulations when the risk of dying
7Note, however, that the wage and the rate of time preference are age-independent in our framework.
This implicitly means that seniority eﬀects balance retirement eﬀects. The question of the life-cycle path
of earnings is not so important in a model that accounts for parental altruism.
8The parameter λ only aﬀects the interest-growth spread through its impact on individual savings.
By contrast, the parameter δ alters both individual behavior and the growth rate of output.
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Figure 1: Baseline simulation: σ = 1, ρ = 1%. There exists a competitive equilibrium
above the line of finite achievements, and it is dynamically eﬃcient above the golden rule
line.
is very low. Second, dynamic ineﬃciency is ruled out for plausible values of the risk of
dying. Hence, the actual life expectancy is suﬃciently low to prevent the occurrence of
dynamically ineﬃcient equilibria. Remarkably, the steady state would be ineﬃcient if δ
were set at its crude value given by Table 1. Such value of the risk of dying would involve
an expected lifetime of 115 years.
The panel of Figure 2 proposes a sensitivity analysis9. We have tried various com-
binations of rate of time preference ρ and EIS σ. When the EIS is one half, dynamic
ineﬃciency can occur for reasonable values of the risk of dying. However, the pure rate
of time preference must be very low, i.e. ρ = −2%. In such a case, the golden rule line
falls within the set of plausible pairs (λ, δ). Assuming that the real (λ, δ) is uniformly
drawn from the set of plausible values, diminished from the subset of parameters’ values
located below the line of finite achievements, one can compute the probability that the
actual steady state is dynamically eﬃcient10. This probability is about 2/3. When the
EIS is one, dynamic ineﬃciency requires that the pure rate of time preference is worth
ρ = 0. In such case, the probability that the steady state is dynamically eﬃcient is about
9In the third column of Figure 2, for σ = 1, ρ = 1%, and σ = 2, ρ = 2%, both the golden rule line and
the line of finite achievments are located below the horizontal axis: the equilibrium is always eﬃcient.
10This probability is obtained by computing the surface occupied by plausible and dynamically eﬃcient
pairs of parameters, and by dividing it by the total surface occupied by plausible pairs of parameters.
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60%. Finally, dynamic ineﬃciency is more likely when the EIS is two. The steady state
is dynamically ineﬃcient when ρ = 0, while it may be ineﬃcient with a probability equal
to 40% when ρ = 1%.
The main lesson derived from such exercises is that dynamic ineﬃciency cannot be
postulated unless one is willing to consider a very low pure rate of time preference (ρ ≤ 0),
or a very large EIS (σ = 2). For instance, when we consider the parameter values used in
Bullard and Russel (1999) — ρ = −1% and σ = 1/2 —, our simulations yield a dynamically
eﬃcient equilibrium. Reaching a conclusion similar to theirs requires lowering the rate of
time preference down to ρ = −2%.
5 Conclusion
Macrodynamic models with finite lifetime and selfish individuals may feature (dynami-
cally) ineﬃcient equilibria, while models with infinite lifetime and altruistic individuals
cannot. However, the intuition suggests that savings motives increase with parental al-
truism and lifetime expectancy, thereby favouring overaccumulation. This paper presents
a continuous time OLG model which generalizes the Blanchard-Buiter-Weil model and al-
lows to clarify the relationships between dynastic altruism, the length of planning horizons,
and dynamic (in)eﬃciency. Our main innovation relies on the introduction of parental
altruism, whose intensity is variable. We reach three main conclusions. First, we show
that parental altruism and life expectancy actually favor overaccumulation. Second, we
explain why dynamic ineﬃciency cannot result in the Ramsey model: a necessary condi-
tion for overaccumulation implies the nonexistence of a dynamic competitive equilibrium.
Third, theoretical results are illustrated by a parameterization from US data. Our nu-
merical exercises suggest that the US economy is dynamically eﬃcient, mainly because
life expectancy is suﬃciently short.
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APPENDIX
proof of lemma 1 The derivation of the equilibrium dynamics follows Blanchard (1985).
The representative individual maximizes (4) subject to (7), (8) and (9). Optimal
consumption satisfies:
∂c (τ , t)
∂t
= σ [r (t)− ρ] c (τ , t) (30)
and the intertemporal budget constraint:Z ∞
t
c (τ , z)β (t, z) dz = x (τ , t) + h (t) (31)
where β (t, z) ≡ exp
¡
−
R z
t [r (s)− nI ] ds
¢
and where h (t) is the human wealth of an
individual alive at t such that:
h (t) =
Z ∞
t
w (z)β (t, z) dz (32)
Computing (30) in (31) yields:
c (τ , t) = p (t) [x (τ , t) + h (t)] (33)
where
p (t) =
∙Z ∞
t
exp
µ
−
Z z
t
[(1− σ) r (s)− nI + σρ] ds
¶
dz
¸−1
(34)
denotes the propensity to consume financial and human wealth.
Let c (t) and x (t) denote, respectively, aggregate (detrended) per capita consump-
tion and financial wealth. Let also ω (t) = w (t) /A (t), and η (t) = h (t) /A (t). We
have:
x (t) = A (t)−1
½
x (0, t) exp [−nEt] +
Z t
0
nE exp [−nE (t− τ)]x (τ , t) dτ
¾
(35)
c (t) = p (t) [x (t) + h (t)] (36)
Diﬀerentiating (34), (35), (36) with respect to time yields:
dx (t)
dt
= [r (t)− (nI + nE + g)]x (t) + ω (t)− c (t) (37)
dc (t)
dt
= {σ [r (t)− ρ]− nE − g} c (t) + nEp (t) η (t) (38)
dp (t)
dt
=
∙
1− (1− σ) r (t)− nI + σρ
p (t)
¸
p (t)2 (39)
In the closed economy, the equilibrium is such that x (t) = k (t) for all t ≥ 0.
Moreover factor prices equal marginal products:
r (t) = f 0 (k (t))− µ (40)
ω (t) = f (k (t))− k (t) f 0 (k (t)) (41)
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Replacing (40), (41), and (36) in (37), (38) and (39), and dropping time indexes,
yields the system composed by (12), (13) and (14).
proof of proposition 1 From equations (12), (13) and (14), a steady-state satisfies:
c =
nEpk
σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ]− g (42)
c = f (k)− (µ+ nI + nE + g) k (43)
p = (1− σ) [f 0 (k)− µ]− nI + σρ (44)
Replace (44) in (42) and define the functions c1, c2 and p such that:
c1 (k) = knE
(1− σ) [f 0 (k)− µ]− nI + σρ
σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ]− g (45)
c2 (k) = f (k)− (µ+ nI + nE + g) k (46)
p (k) = (1− σ) [f 0 (k)− µ]− nI + σρ (47)
A non-trivial steady-state is a strictly positive vector (k∗, c∗, p∗) solving c∗ = c1 (k∗) =
c2 (k∗) and p∗ = p (k∗).
Point (i). We proceed in two steps. We give a suﬃcient condition such that there
exists k∗ ∈
¡
0, k¯
¢
where k¯ satisfies f 0
¡
k¯
¢
= µ+ ρ + g/σ. We then prove that k∗ is
unique.
Step 1. If (19) holds, there exists k∗ such that c1 (k∗) = c2 (k∗), c∗ > 0, and p∗ > 0.
We first characterize the domains of k such that p and c1 are positive. Define kˆ
such that p
³
kˆ
´
= 0. Now observe that provided f 0 (0) − µ > (nI − σρ) / (1− σ),
one has p (k) > 0 for (i) k ∈
h
0, kˆ
´
and σ ∈ (0, 1) and (ii) k ∈ R+ and σ > 1. For
σ = 1, condition (6) guarantees that p (k) > 0 for all k. Now turn to c1. First,
p (k) > 0 yields c1 (k) > 0 if σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ] − g > 0. Observe that this latter
condition is satisfied for all k ∈
£
0, k¯
¢
if f 0 (0) − µ > ρ + g/σ. Now, observe using
(6), that for σ ∈ (0, 1), one has k¯ < kˆ and ρ + g/σ > (nI − σρ) / (1− σ), while for
σ > 1, one has (nI − σρ) / (1− σ) < ρ + g/σ. Hence, c1 (k) > 0 and p (k) > 0 for
all k ∈
£
0, k¯
¢
provided that
f 0 (0)− µ > max {(nI − σρ) / (1− σ) , ρ+ g/σ} (48)
Then, the function c1 :
£
0, k¯
¢
→ R+ satisfies c1 (0) = 0 and limk→k¯ c1 (k) = +∞.
Conversely, the function c2 : R+ → R satisfies c2 (0) ≥ 0. If µ+nI+nE+g > 0, c2 is
first increasing, until k satisfies f 0 (k) = µ+nI+nE+g, and then strictly decreasing
to −∞. If µ+ nI + nE + g ≤ 0, c2 is strictly increasing and satisfies c2
¡
k¯
¢¿ +∞.
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Consequently, the existence is trivial if c2 (0) > 0 and requires c01 (0) < c
0
2 (0) if
c2 (0) = 0. This latter condition can be expressed:
nE [(1− σ) [f 0 (0)− µ]− nI + σρ]
σ [f 0 (0)− µ− ρ]− g < f
0 (0)− (µ+ nI + nE + g) . (49)
Note that assumption f 0 (0) > µ+ρ+g/σ implies, using (6), that f 0 (0) > µ+nI+g.
Hence, condition (49) writes:
f 0 (0) > µ+ ρ+ (nE + g) /σ (50)
Conditions (48) and (50) ensure the existence of a non-trivial steady-state. Merging
them yields (19).
Step 2. k∗ is unique.
Let φ (k) ≡ c1 (k)− c2 (k). Hence,
φ (k) = knE
(1− σ) [f 0 (k)− µ]− nI + σρ
σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ]− g − f (k) + (µ+ nI + nE + g) k (51)
Its derivative is
φ0 (k) =
nE [f 0 (k)− µ− nI − g]
σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ]− g −
σknEf 00 (k)
£
ρ− nI −
¡
1− 1σ
¢
g
¤
[σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ]− g]2
−f 0 (k) + (µ+ nI + g) (52)
Using c1 (k∗) = c2 (k∗) one has:
nE [f 0 (k∗)− µ− nI − g]
σ [f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ]− g =
f (k∗)
k∗
− (µ+ nI + g) (53)
Replacing (53) in (52) yields:
φ0 (k∗) =
f (k∗)
k∗
− f 0 (k∗)−
σknEf 00 (k∗)
£
ρ− nI −
¡
1− 1σ
¢
g
¤
{σ [f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ]− g}2 (54)
Since f is strictly concave and given condition (6), one has φ0 (k∗) > 0.
Point (ii). The first inequality f 0 (k∗)−µ ≥ ρ+g/σ follows directly from limk→k¯ c2 (k) =
+∞. To prove the second inequality, let ε < 1 be such that f 0 (k∗) − µ = ρ +
[g + nE (1− ε)] /σ. We will show that ε > 0. Replacing this expression in (53) to
obtain:
f (k∗)
k∗
=
ρ− nI − g
¡
1− 1σ
¢
1− ε +
nE
σ
+ (µ+ nI + g) . (55)
Now, since f (k) > kf 0 (k), one has:
∙
ρ− nI − g
µ
1− 1
σ
¶¸
ε
1− ε > −
nE
σ
ε (56)
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Given condition (6) and nE > 0, we conclude that ε < 0 is not possible. If nE = 0,
then ε = 0 is the only solution.
Point (iii). The Jacobian matrix computed at steady state is:
J =
⎡
⎢⎣
f 0 (k∗)− (µ+ nI + nE + g) −1 0
σf 00 (k∗) c∗ − nEp∗ σ [f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ]− g −nEk∗
− (1− σ) f 00 (k∗) p∗ 0 p∗
⎤
⎥⎦ (57)
with c∗ = nEp∗k∗ {σ [f 0 (k)− µ− ρ]− g}−1 and p∗ = (1− σ) [f 0 (k∗)− µ]−nI +σρ.
Matrix J admits three eigenvalues v1, v2, v3, which solve:
−v3 + T (J) v2 −B (J) v +D (J) = 0 (58)
where D (J) and T (J) are respectively the determinant and the trace, where:
B (J) =
¯¯¯¯
¯ f 0 (k∗)− (µ+ nI + nE + g) −1σf 00 (k∗) c∗ − nEp∗ σ [f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ]− g
¯¯¯¯
¯
+
¯¯¯¯
¯ σ [f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ]− g −nEk∗0 p∗
¯¯¯¯
¯+
¯¯¯¯
¯ f 0 (k∗)− (µ+ nI + nE + g) 0− (1− σ) f 00 (k∗) p∗ p∗
¯¯¯¯
¯
(59)
The determinant satisfies:
D (J) = {[f 0 (k∗)− (µ+ nI + g)] [f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ− (g + nE) /σ]}σp∗
+σc∗
£
ρ− nI − g
¡
1− 1σ
¢¤
f 00 (k∗)
(60)
Use the bounds for f 0 (k∗) established in Point (ii) and condition (6) to conclude
that D (J) < 0. Consequently, either there is one eigenvalue with a negative real
part and the two others with positive real parts, or all eigenvalues have a negative
real part. We now prove that the latter case cannot be observed. We proceed by
contradiction by showing the impossibility of having simultaneously T (J) < 0 and
B (J) > 0. The trace is given by:
T (J) = [f 0 (k∗)− (µ+ nI + nE + g)] + σ
h
f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ− g
σ
i
+ p∗ (61)
which is negative only if f 0 (k∗) < (µ+ nI + nE + g). Then, B (J) satisfies:
B (J) = [f 0 (k∗)− (µ+ nI + nE + g)] [f 0 (k∗)− µ− g − nI ]
+σf 00 (k∗) c∗ + σ [f 0 (k∗)− µ− ρ− (g + nE) /σ] p∗
(62)
which is positive only if f 0 (k∗) > (µ+ nI + nE + g). Consequently, two eigenvalues
have positive real parts and the third one has a negative real part. The equilibrium
is locally saddle-path stable.
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proof of proposition 2 We need to show that γ strictly decreases with λ. Points (ii)
and (iii) are immediate corollaries. Using equations (25) and (53) and taking the
derivative of γ with respect to λ yields:
dγ
dλ
= f 00 (k∗)
dk∗
dλ
(63)
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation φ (k∗;λ) = 0 with φ defined in
(51) gives:
dk∗
dλ
= −∂φ (k
∗;λ) /∂λ
∂φ (k∗;λ) /∂k
(64)
Proposition 1 shows that ∂φ (k∗;λ) /∂k > 0. Moreover,
∂φ (k∗;λ)
∂λ
=
mk∗
σ (r∗ − ρ)− g {σ (r
∗ − ρ)− g − nE − (r∗ − nI − g)} (65)
with r∗ = f 0 (k∗) − µ. Using the upper bound of the interest rate, we have
σ (r∗ − ρ) < nE + g. Using the lower bound, we have r∗ > ρ + g/σ. In addition,
ρ > ρlim implies that r
∗ > nI + g. Consequently, dk∗/dλ > 0.
proof of proposition 3 To establish (i), (ii) and (iii), we need to show that γ strictly
increases with δ. Using equations (25) and (53) and taking the derivative of γ with
respect to δ yields:
dγ
dδ
= f 00 (k∗)
dk∗
dδ
+ 1 (66)
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation φ (k∗; δ) = 0 with φ defined in
(51) gives:
dk∗
dδ
= −∂φ (k
∗; δ) /∂δ
∂φ (k∗; δ) /∂k
(67)
which, as in the previous proof, has the sign of −∂φ (k∗; δ) /∂δ. Then,
∂φ (k∗; δ)
∂δ
=
k∗
σ (r∗ − ρ)− g {nE − σ (r
∗ − ρ) + g} (68)
As g < σ (r∗ − ρ) < nE + g, one has dk∗/dδ < 0 and dγ/dδ > 0.
To establish (iv), note that lim
δ→∞
γ = ∞. The result follows from the fact that γ is
strictly increasing in δ.
proof of proposition 4 To establish (i), use equations (25) and (53) and take the deriv-
ative of γ with respect to σ to obtain:
dγ
dσ
= f 00 (k∗)
dk∗
dσ
(69)
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Applying the implicit function theorem to equation φ (k∗;σ) = 0 with φ defined in
(51) gives:
dk∗
dσ
= −∂φ (k
∗;σ) /∂σ
∂φ (k∗;σ) /∂k
(70)
where,
∂φ (k∗;σ)
∂σ
=
−k∗nE (r∗ − ρ) (r∗ − nI − g)
[σ (r∗ − ρ)− g]2
(71)
which is negative according to the proof of proposition 2. Consequently, dγ/dσ < 0.
To establish (ii) take the derivative of γ with respect to g to obtain:
dγ
dg
= f 00 (k∗)
dk∗
dg
− 1 (72)
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation φ (k∗; g) = 0 with φ defined in
(51) gives:
dk∗
dg
= −∂φ (k
∗; g) /∂g
∂φ (k∗; g) /∂k
(73)
where
∂φ (k∗; g)
∂g
= k∗nE
(1− σ) r∗ − nI + σρ
[σ (r∗ − ρ)− g]2
+ k∗ (74)
Recall with the proof of proposition 1 that (1− σ) r∗ − nI + σρ is the aggregate
propensity to consume; since it is necessarily positive, conclude that dk∗/dg < 0.
However, the sign of dγ/dg is indeterminate. One may nonetheless observe that,
sign
½
lim
g→+∞
γ
¾
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−∞ if σ < 1
< 0 if σ = 1
+∞ if σ > 1
(75)
(iii) Observe from (51) that k∗ → 0 when n→ +∞. Hence,
sign
½
lim
n→+∞
γ
¾
= sign
n
lim
k→0
(α (k)− σ)
o
(76)
The result follows from the continuity of γ with respect to n.
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Fig.2 : Sensitivity analysis 
There exists a competitive equilibrium above the line of finite achievements, and it is dynamically efficient above the golden rule line. 
